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RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
Edited by the
LEGAL PUBLICATiONS BoARD or
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERsITY SCHOOL or LAW
OLIVR M. Tow SEND, Case Editor

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF DECEPTION ("LIE-DETEcToR") TEsTs-[New York] On trial for robbery
in the first degree, as a second offender, the defendant offered the
expert testimony of Rev. W. G.
Summers as to the results of a
"lie-detector" test which had been
performed on him. Overruling the
objection of the district attorney
the court received the evidence
and permitted the jury to evaluate
it: People v. Kenny, 3 N. Y. S.
(2d) 348 (1938).
The principal case is the first reported decision, and at that only a
trial court decision, allowing the
admissibility of the results of machines or instxuxents popularly
described as "lie-detectors." The
only two former cases both reached
the opposite result:
Frye v.
United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.
C. 1923); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis.
651, 246 N. W. 314 (1933).
The Frye case decided in 1923
involved the use of the systolic
blood pressure test of W. M. Marston and the court after an intelligent consideration of the problem
said:
" We think that the systolic
blood pressure deception test has
not yet gained such standing and
scientific recognition among phy-

siological and psychological authorities as would justify the
courts in admitting evidence deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus
far made.'
Being the first case on the point it
received many able and favorable
criticisms in legal publications:
(1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1138;
(Y924) 33 Yale L. J. 771; (1924)
24 Col. L. Rev. 429.
Ten years later the Wisconsin
court passing on the admissibility
of a proffered test on the Keeler
Polygraph still felt that deception
tests had not yet passed beyond
the experimental stage; see notes
in (1933) 24 J. Crim. L. 440; (1933)
13 B. U. L. Rev. 321; (1933) 8 Wis.
L. Rev. 283.
But by March, 1938, the Queens
County Court of New York decides
that the Rev. Summers' development of the pathometer is safely
beyond the experimental stage.
For the court, as in the two previous cases, adopts as a basis the
legal principle set out in 2 Wigmore, Evidende (2d ed. 1923) §875:
"if ever there is devised a psychological test of the evaluation of
witnesses the law will run to meet
it." And this court is confident the
time has come.
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A brief review of Father Summers' accomplishments and claims
for his instrument as given in the
preliminary examination readily
reveals the basis for this view of
the court. As head of the Department of Psychology at the Graduate School of Fordham University,
Summers holds two Ph.D.'s: one
in physics from Georgetown University, and one in psychology
from Gregorian University at
Rome. Besides this he has done
research at Prague University in
Czechoslovakia and at the University of Vienna. And he modestly claims practical infallibility
for his deception tests in 6,000
laboratory tests and 49 tests of actual criminal suspects. Such a
record is not to be taken lightly
and to- better evaluate the worth
of it requires a brief summary of
the work and achievements of
other experimenters in the field.
Physical appearance, motions,
and mannerisms of a witness are
well recognized tests of his credibility both in the lay and in the
judicial mind: Howard v. Louisville Ry., 32 Ky. L. 309, 105 S. W.

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES

inspiration-expiration ratio. This
method was later refined and used
by Burtt of Ohio State University;
cf. (1923) 4 J. of Experimental
Psych. 1. Meanwhile W. M. Marston working under Miinsterberg at
Harvard developed a test based on
the changes of the blood pressure;
(f917) 2 J.of Experimental Psych.
117; (1921') 11 J. Crim. L. 551.
Later Dr. J. A. Larson conceived
the idea of combining the respiratory and blood pressure tests to
form the so-called Berkeley LieDetector Test and for the first time
actual work was done in connection with the police. His results
were most encouraging but he admitted at that time there was no
test which was suitable for "the
positive identification of deception"; (1922) 47 A. B. A. Rep. 619;
(1921) f2 J. Crim. L. 390. For the
best discussion of the theory and
development of these various techniques see McCormick, Deception
Tests and the Law of Evidence,
(1927) 15 Cal. L. Rev. 484.
Since that time the main work
has been done during the past eight
years by Leonarde Keeler and his
932 (1907); Boykin v. People, 22 associates at the Scientific Crime
Colo. 496, 45 Pac. 419 (1896); but Detection Laboratory of Northsee Purdy v. People, 140 Ill. 46, 29 western University School of Law.
N. E. 700 (1892). But in recent years Fourteen years ago Keeler dethere has been a steady effort to veloped his "Polygraph" which
develop more scientific tests. Some combines instruments for testing
thirty years ago Professor Miin- the respiratory changes, the
sterberg advocated an "association changes in the blood pressure, and
word and reaction test" for use by the rate of heart beat. Later he
the courts (Miinsterberg, On the supplemented his technique and
Witness Stand, 73). But the prac- instrument with a psychogalvanoticality of such a test was blasted graph similar to that used by Sumby Professor Wigmore, (1909) 3 mers; Keeler, A Method for DeIll. L. Rev. 399, and the develop- tecting Deception, (1930) 1 Am. J.
ment swung off to physical phe- Pol. Sci. 38; Inbau, The "Lie-Denomenon.
tector," (1935) 40 Sci. Mon. 81.
In 1914 Benussi developed the Well over 14,000 tests have been
respiratory test based on the rela- made including criminal suspects,
tion between false answers and the bank employees, and laboratory
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material. The results have been
remarkable but no claim of infallibility is made. These experimenters estimate an accuracy of
85% in laboratory cases, and confessions have been obtained in approximately 75% of actual cases
where deception was shown; cf.
Inbau, supra at 83.
During all this period psychology departments in many colleges
and universities have been experimenting with the changes in
electrical resistance of the skin
as a test of deception. Requiring only a galvanometer and a
Wheatstone bridge, it provides a
simple yet extremely sensitive instrument for laboratory work. Yet
most workers have not found it too
reliable when used alone. When
used in connection with the pneumograph and the sphygmomanometer, as with the Keeler Polygraph, it has proven to be of some
assistance; but not of any considerable practical value in actual cases.
Now Father Summers in his selfstyled psychograph or pathometer
employs only an instrument for
recording the psycho-galvanic reaction of the skin. From his testimony in the Kenny case we learn
that he began his work in 1931.
While working on human emotional reactions he was led off into
the field of detection of deception,
and he has occupied himself with
that since 1932. After testing 6,000
"guinea pigs" in his laboratory he
was convinced that his apparatus
and technique were "effectively
100% efficient." And in a critical
test of 271 persons divided into
three groups he claims to have
been able to detect 98% of the
guilty, better than 98% of the accomplices, and 100% of the innocent. As he states it, such results
are due to the refinement of his
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the
peculiar
instrument
and
rhythm and repetition used in the
asking of significant questions.
Thoroughly convinced of the effectiveness of his test Summers was
ready for the outside world. So
he performed tests of 49 actual
suspects; offered his testimony in
at least two trials; and aided the
sale of Conoco Oil in a full page
advertisement giving a picture and
chart of the "Lie-Detector" (May
21, 1938), Saturday Evening Post.
Yet when asked by the defense
counsel in the Kenny case as to
the results of the 49 actual cases
the following delightfully vague
dialogue occurred:
Q. Now Father, in connection
with those 49 cases with respect to which you were
asked to apply this machine
or apparatus on, would you
tell us what the result of that
was?
A. The results have been, in all
the cases which are closed
to date, uniformly confirmatory of our results.
Q. In other words the courts
subsequently affirmed or the
public officials subsequently
confirmed the results that
you received from your use
of this apparatus?
A. Or-yes, that is substantially
correct.
In view of the general development of lie detection and of the
specific work of Summers, was the
court justified in deciding that the
pathometer had gone beyond the
experimental stages into the realm
of general scientific acceptance?
We do not believe so for two reasons.
First, no other experimenter in
the field has been able to claim
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100% efficiency. The Staff of the Lie-Detector Test" (1938), scoffs at
Scientific Crime Detection LaboraSummers and claims his invention
tory using a psycho-galvanometric
of the systolic blood pressure test
test, in connection with two other is the reliable test; see Inbau, Book
recognized tests, make no such Review (pp. 305-308, this Journal),
claim of infallibility. So, unless we
and (June, 1938) 33 Ill. L. Rev.,
are to write Summer's claim off as which characterizes this book as
pure exaggeration, we must credit very unscientific. And the Scienhis technique and interpretation of tific Crime Detection Laboratory
results with almost unbelievable Staff believe their work has been
efficacy. Secondly, it is apparent the most trustworthy, while at the
that Summers has not yet consame time acknowledging severe
ducted enough tests under actual limitations upon the accuracy of
conditions to justify his confidence the technique. In such a state of
in the device. Other experimenters scientific disagreement the objechave found the galvanometric test tion of the Wisconsin court in the
more reliable in laboratory work Bohner case is cogent: "the admisthan in actual practice. Yet Sumsion of the lie-detector may easily
mers assumes just the opposite, al- result in the trial of the lie-detecthough he has tried it on only 49 tor rather than the issues of the
actual cases. Further, on these 49 case."
cases it is not at all clear from the
But even more compelling is the
testimony how the results were possibility of "complications and
checked or what was the matheabuses" foreseen by the court in
matical percentage of accuracy.
the Bohner case and argued to the
But the court, anxious to lead court in the Kenny case. At the
the way and desirous of showing present time there are a host of
its breadth of vision and liberality, incompetent
and unscrupulous
accepts Summers findings as unpersons awaiting the admission of
debatable. They point out that obthe lie detection test to offer their
jections to scientific evidence are own "lie-detectors" tests to the
not novel; that the admissibility of highest bidder; cf. Keeler, Defingerprints, handwriting analysis, bunking the Lie-Detector, (1934)
rifle markings, and psychiatric evi25 J. Crim. L. 153, 159; Inbau, Dedence came only after constant retection of Deception Technique
buffs. This is all very true but it Admitted as Evidence, (1935) 26 J.
is no reason for a too hasty acCrim. L. 262, 270; Inbau, The Adceptance of the "lie-detector"; cf. missibility of Scientific Evidence,
Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Crim- (October, 1935) Law and Coninal Cases, (1934) 24 J. Crim. L. temporary Problems (Duke Uni825, 1140. The arguments of the versity). Inasmuch as the tests deFrye case and the Bohner case
pend largely on a diagnosis of the
still seem peculiarly applicable to results registered by the instruthe pathometer.
ments the matter can at best be
Even today, fifteen years after largely one of opinion. Consethe first case, there is no substanquently there is no tangible critial agreement either as to instruteria by which judge or jury may
ment or as to technique. Summers adequately evaluate the testimony.
claims his is the reliable one. So this field, far more than fingerMarston in his recent book, "The prints, or ballistics, is prone to the

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
quackery
viduals.

of

self-seeking

indi-

[Illinois] While accused was driv-

ing his automobile down the wrong
The decision in the Kenny case side of the street at a high rate of
having been for the defendant, it speed, he simultaneously struck
is very doubtful if there will be an and killed two pedestrians (A & B).
appeal to the higher court. But Upon being indicted for the manshortly after it was decided a de- slaughter of A, the accused was set
fendant in a murder trial in the at liberty under the Illinois statute
Ndw York City Court in Kings providing for discharge for want of
County offered the testimony of prosecution within four months of
Summers once again. This court commitment.
Ill.
Smith-Hurd
refused to follow the Kenny case Crim. Code ch. 38 §748. Subseand rejected the evidence: Peoquently the accused was indicted
ple v. Forte, U. S. L. Wk., July 5, and convicted of the manslaughter
1938, p. 12. In line with what we of B. This conviction was affirmed
have said that seems to be the over defendant's plea on appeal of
sounder view.
double jeopardy. People v. Allen,
Perhaps the best solution is a 14 N. E. (2d) 397 (1938) (two juscompromise position: allow the tices dissenting). The court stated
evidence to be admitted only if the that there was no constitutional
prosecuting attorney and the debar to conviction here as the confense counsel mutually agree on a stitutional provision against double
particular test and also agree to jeopardy looks to the identity of
accept the results as evidence. the offense and not to the act, citThis procedure was followed in a ing State v. Billotto, 104 Oh. St. 13,
Wisconsin case, State v. Loniello
35 N. E. 285 (1922). Looking,
and Grignano,in the Circuit Court then, to the identity of the offense,
of Columbia County; see for a dis- the court determines that two ofcussion of this case Inbau, Detec- fenses may spring from a single act
tion of Deception Technique Adand both may be prosecuted sepmitted as Evidence, (1935) 26 J. arately without placing the ofCrim. L. 262. Such a procedure fender in double jeopardy.
avoids the two main objections to
On this point the courts are in
the wholesale admission of such hopeless conflict. One line of cases
evidence at the present time. First, holds the act to be one offense rethere will be no necessity for long gardless of the number or degree
examinations of the expert wit- of the consequences of that act.
State v. Wheelock, 216 Iowa 1428,
nesses and their techniques. Secondly, we can be assured that both 250 N. W. 617 (1933) (three persides will make an honest effort to sons killed in auto accident through
engage a competent and reliable negligence of accused; acquittal of
operator for the test. And thus defendant on charge of manslaughmay we simply and effectively ter of one victim a bar to further
prosecution for manslaughter of
keep the quacks and their "lieothers); Smith v. State, 159 Tenn.
detectors" from the courtrooms.
674, 21 S. W. (2d) 400 (1929)
HoRACE W. JoiA_.
(where a previous conviction for
manslaughter bars conviction for
FomEr JEOPARDY-DIERSE OF- assault); People v. Barr, 259 N. Y.
104, 1"81 N. E. 64 (1932) (Court
EMNSES SUBSISTING IN ONE ACT.-
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held death of ten people in one fire
constituted but one offense). Also
State v. Damon, 2 Tyler 387 (Vt.,
1803); Sadberry v. State, 39 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 466, 46 S. W. 639 (1898);
16 C. J. 283. The opposite line of
authority says the act may result
in more than one offense, as in the
principal case. State v. Fredlund,
200 Minn. 44, 273 N. W. 353 (1937)
(auto collision resulted in death of
two people; acquittal on trial for
death of one not a bar to further
prosecution for death of the other);
Fay v. State, 71 P. (2d) 768 (Okla.,
1937) (several children struck by
auto at the same time); State v.
Taylor, 1:85 Wash. 198, 52 P. (2d)
1252 (1936) (five persons killed in
auto collision, each killing a separate offense), also Vaughn v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 273
(1821); People v. Vaughn, 215 Ill.
App. 452 (1919).
The utter confusion existing in
this field is well illustrated by comparing those cases mentioned
above, when several deaths occur
from a single act and yet only one
offense can be charged, with the
cases where two degrees of a crime
are involved, as homicide and assault. In the latter type of case
some jurisdictions will punish both
degrees of the crime. State v.
Standifer, 5 Porter 523 (Ala.,
1837); Winn v. State, 92 Wis. 571,
52 N. W. 775 (1892). This sometimes results in the anomaly of a
defendant who kills twice with the
same bullet being better protected
from punishment than another defendant who kills one and wounds
the other of his victims.
Several tests have been advanced
by the various courts which are
supposed to aid in the determination of the question whether there
is one offense or more. Some
merely state that when there has

been but a single act, there must
necessarily be but a single offense.
See Gunter v. State, 111 Ala. 23,
20 So. 632 (1895); Spannell v. State,
83 Tex. Cr. Rep. 118, 203 S. W. 357
(1918). This seems to be more a
flat declaration of policy than a
test. A related criterion has been
labelled the "same transaction"
test which holds that a series of
acts closely connected, as the repetitious shooting of a gun, may constitute one act in law and thus one
offense. State v. Houchins, 102 W.
Va. 169, 134 S. E. 740 (1926). By
this test the perpetrators of the
St. Valentine's Day massacre
(where seven men were murdered
by a gangsters machine gun)
would have constituted but one offense. A third standard is the subjective one called the intent test.
Under this view the court looks
into the mind of the accused to determine whether he has a single or
multiple intent. If only one intent
is found then there is a single offense, regardless of the number or
severity of the results of the defendant's act. Hurst v. State, 24
Ala. App. 47, 129 So. 714 (1930);
Burnam v. State, 58 S. E. 683 (Ga.,
1907). To find a separate intent
for every offense is pure conjecture at best. Who can accurately
read the inner thoughts and feelings of another's mind? In cases
of criminal negligence, as the instant case, the intent test obviously
fails, for intent is not involved.
However, some jurisdictions which
sponsor this standard say that the
negligent killing of two or more by
the same act could not be more
than one offense, because there
was no intent. See State v. Wheelock, supra, and cases there cited.
Another and perhaps the most
logical test used by the courts is
called the "same evidence" test,
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an objective test which looks to the
identity of the offense rather than
that of the act or the intent. Wharton on Criminal Law (12th ed.
1932) §396; Vaughn v. Commonwealth, supra; State v. Billotto,
supra; State v. Fredlund, supra;
People v. Majors, 65 Cal. 138 3 Pac.
597 (1'884); State v: Corbett, 117
S. C. 356, 109 S. E. 133 (1921).
Thus, where there has been two
or more killings, there are as many
offenses as there are deaths, no
matter if there is only one intent
or but a single act. The courts
have circumvented the procedural
double jeopardy difficulty by placing emphasis upon the name of the
person injured. State v. Clavey,
355 Ill. 358, 189 N. E. 364 (1934)
(where the name" of deceased was
held to be an essential fact in the
indictment); Wharton, op. cit. §646.
But see State v. Wheelock, supra.
Thus where the facts are the same
under two indictments, the court
will allow conviction under both
indictments if the second indictment differs from the first only as
to the name of the injured person.
The basic reason for all these
rules penetrates to a question of
policy that can be decided only
after one determines whether the
killing of one individual as such is
an offense against the state. If one
is to be responsible for the consequences of his reckless acts, as in
manslaughter, then that one should
be responsible for as many killings
as spring from his criminally negligent act. It is difficult to understand why two killings should be
punishable as one if they happened
to have come about through a
single act. In tort law a tort feasor is liable for all consequences
of negligence which he could reasonably foresee. Why not apply
this doctrine to the criminally
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negligent also? Then a reckless
driver, as in the instant case,
should foresee, that his recklessness
might result in the death of one,
two, or more people. He has a
separate foreseeability for each
person, so that each injury constitutes a separate offense and is punisbable as such. The criticism of
this argument, that repetition of
trial will hinder court efficiency
and subject accused to consecutive
trials, is answered by a possibility
of joinder of similar offenses in one
indictment. The principal case in
effect recognizes the analogy to
tort principles and lays stress on
the consequences rather than the
act or intent. This rationale of the
problem seems the most sensible
as it exacts a just penalty from
the criminal for his crimes against
society.
0. WENDELj LAwNi G.
EvKNCE-ADnsssiBIrvY OF EviDENCE OF A CoxsPIRAcY NOT
CHARGED IN THE IbicTi mr.-[New
York] Can an accused be convicted under an indictment charging him with having done certain
specific acts, when the proof adduced at the trial shows merely
that he conspired with others to
do these acts, and that his co-conspirators actually did them? This
was the question before the Court
of Appeals of New York in the recent case of People v. Luciano, 14
N. E. 2d, 433. The court answered
the question affirmatively.
Luciano and others were members of a gang of criminals which
sought to gain control of prostitution and other commercialized vice
in New York City. The prostitutes
were induced to work through the
combination by force and violence.
In return for various sums paid by
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them, the women received room
and board and "protection," consisting of bail and legal defense if
they were arrested. Luciano and
his confederates were indicted for
three types of crime: placing a female in a house of prostitution, receiving money for having so placed
her, and receiving money from the
earnings of the woman so placed,
without giving consideration therefor. There was no evidence submitted to prove that Luciano himself did any of these acts. However, the jury found that he had
conspired with others to do them,
and that these others had performed them. On the basis of the
conspiracy he was convicted. This
is entirely in accord with New
York authority. Penal Law of
New York §2; People v. McKane,
143 N. Y. 455, 8 N. E. 950 (1894);
People v. Bliven, 112 N. Y. 79, 19
N. E. 638 (1889); People v. Cassidy,
213 N. Y. 388, 107 N. E. 713 (1915);
People v. Wicks, 42 N. Y. S. 630,
affirmed without opinion, 154 N. Y.
766; 49 N. E. 1102 (1896); People
v. Micelli, 142 N. Y. S. 102, affirmed
without opinion, 216 N. Y. 727, 111
N. E. 1094 (1:913), and cases there
cited. In view of these precedents,
the dissent of Judge Rippey, based
in part on the ground that the defendant was convicted of a crime
with which he was not charged, is
surprising.
People v. McKane, 143 N. Y. 455,
38 N. E. 950 (1894), is the leading
New York case on this point. The
defendant in that case induced
members of the board of registry
to violate the Election Law. He
was charged with violating that
law and was convicted, although
the statute was so worded that
only members of the board were
legally capable of violating it. He
had conspired to break it and that
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was considered enough upon which
to convict him. In the earlier case
of People v. Bliven, 112 N. Y. 79,
19 N. E. 638 (1889), the defendant
was convicted of performing acts
which he himself could not actually
have performed at that time, as he
was absent when the crime was
committed. The court said: "It
[the crime] was proved by showing that the act although committed
by a third person, and in the absence of defendant, was so committed by his aid and procurement, and in that way in law and
in morals and in good sense he
committed the act himself." Judge
Chase summed up the New York
view in People v. Cassidy, 213 N.
Y. 388, 107 N. E. 713 (1915), when
he stated: "When sufficient evidence of a common design and
purpose amounting to a conspiracy
has been given to make the question one for the jury, any evidence
of the acts and declarations of the
conspirators in furtherance of the
common purpose is competent. In
a case like this it is not necessary
in order to make such proof competent that the conspiracy should
be charged in the indictment:'
This seems to be the general rule
as well. Wharton's Criminal Evidence (1l'th ed. 1935) §701. Hammond v. State, 173 Ark. 674, 298 S.
W. 714 (1927); Cossack v. U. S.,
(C. C. A. 9th, 1936), 82 F. (2d)
214, cert. denied, 298 U. S. 654;
298 U. S. 678, rehearing denied,
298 U. S. 691 (1936); Coplin
v. U. S., (C. C. A. 9th, 1937), 88 F.
(2d) 652, 660; Belden et al. v. U. S.,
(C. C. A. 9th, 191:5), 223 Fed. 726;
Vilson v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9th, 1932),
61 F. (2d) 901; Kraus v. U. S.,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1937), 87 F. (2d) 656;
Lee Dip v. U. S., (C. C. A. 9th,
1937), 92 F. (2d) 802, cert. de-

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
nied, 58 S. C. R. 526, 82 L. Ed. 510

(1938).
One New York case goes further.
It is People v. Putnam, 85 N. Y. S.
1056, affirmed without opinion, 179
N. Y. 518, 71 N. E. 1135 (1904).
The defendant in that case was indicted for grand larceny. He was
found to be one of a group of conspirators prosecuting the felonious
enterprise. He was not only convicted on the basis of the conspiracy, but the court allowed evidence to be introduced against him
of the acts of his co-conspirators
in a similar undertaking, but one
in which he was not concerned.
The case of Lee Dip v. U. S. (C. C.
A. 9th, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 802, cert.
denied, 58 S. C. R. 526, 82
L. Ed. 510 (1938), might be considered an even further extension
of the principle, although when the
facts are considered there are
qualifying circumstances which
make the decision justifiable. The
defendant in that case was suspected of concealing opium. While
the officers were searching his
premises, one Chin Fook came in
through the back door carrying
opium. The defendant was charged
with concealing grains of the narcotic found on the premises, but
the evidence concerning Chin Fook
was admitted and held to have
been properly admitted upon appeal. It was not proven that Chin
Fook was concerned in the concealing of the opium for which the
defendant was indicted, nor that
Lee Dip and Chin Fook were conspirators in the opium business.
However, it was brought out at the
trial that they were partners in the
maintenance of a nearby gambling
house. Chin Fook had a key to
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the defendant's premises, and there
were other circumstances tending
to show a close relationship between the two. In the principal
case, the evidence of the conspiracy
admitted was of the one in which
the defendant was a conspirator.
In the Putnam case, supra,the evidence admitted concerned the acts
of the defendant's co-conspirators
in a similar undertaking, but one
in which the defendant was not
concerned. In the Lee Dip case
the court allowed evidence concerning a possible conspirator to be
introduced who was not involved
in the transaction for which the de-

fendant was on trial. This is an
extension of the general view, and
it is doubtful if it is a wise one.
The evidence does not really concern the charge for which the defendant is on trial, and might conceivably prejudice his interests.
The jury should not be influenced
by the crimes of his associates in
weighing his guilt or innocence.
On the whole, the doctrine as
expressed by the principal case
seems to be a sound one. It is certainly valuable, for if we did not
have it, criminals like Luciano
would be free today. There is no
reason to believe that it would be
unfair to the accused. If a person
has procured the commission of a
criminal act, or induced another to
commit it, he should be punished
as severely as the one actually performing it. The mere fact that
conspiracy is indictable as a separate offense should not operate
to preclude its admissibility as evidence in other criminal prosecutions.
JAMS KAY.

